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Abstract 
Over the last 15 years, the evolution of labor costs has been very diverse across EMU 
countries. Since wages have important second-round effects on prices and 
competitiveness, and EMU countries do not have the tool of the nominal exchange rate 
to correct for such imbalances, understanding the determinants of the wage is a 
matter of increasing concern and debate. We estimate the equilibrium wage equation 
for the Euro Area over the period 1995-2011 using panel cointegration techniques 
that allow for cross-section dependence and structural breaks. The results show that 
the equilibrium wage has a positive relation with productivity and negative relation 
with unemployment, as expected. We also include institutional variables in our 
analysis, showing that a more flexible labor market is consistent with long-run wage 
moderation. Allowing for a regime break, we find that, since 2004, possibly due to 
increased international competition, wage determination was more strictly related to 
productivity, and real wage appreciation triggers a drop in the real wage. 
Furthermore, results point to a wage-moderating role of government intervention and 
concertation in wage bargaining.  
 
JEL Classification: E24; J31; C23 
Keywords: panel cointegration, wage setting, labor market. 
 
  
                                                          
*
 Corresponding author. Phone no.: (+34) 9638 28937. E-mail addresses: gaetano.dadamo@uv.es 
(G. D’Adamo); camarero@eco.uji.es (M. Camarero); cecilio.tamarit@uv.es (C. Tamarit).  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The wage equation is a crucial element of any comprehensive model of the 
macroeconomy. A large strand of literature, since Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1994), has estimated the relationship between wages and unemployment à la 
Phillips (1958), and more generally the equilibrium equation for the real wage.1 
In the present paper, we use empirical techniques recently introduced by the 
literature to provide an estimation of the long-run equilibrium wage equation for 
the Euro Area, also taking into account the role of labor market institutions. 
As shown in Figure 1, over the last 15 years the evolution of the real wage across 
EMU countries has been very diverse; these differences, in turn, were reflected in 
aggregate unit labor costs. On the one hand, wage setting has important second-
round effects on prices and, therefore, potentially on competitiveness: when a 
country records persistently high inflation - for example due to increasing unit 
labor costs - with respect to the other member states of the Monetary Union, it will 
experience real exchange rate appreciation and a progressive loss of 
competitiveness. On the other hand, EMU countries cannot use the tool of the 
nominal exchange rate to correct divergent price dynamics. For this reason, the 
only way to correct such inflation differential in absence of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation is via internal devaluation.  
Understanding how wage determination works in the euro area is therefore a 
matter of primary concern, also given the emphasis that the OECD first (OECD, 
2004) and the European Commission especially in more recent years  have been 
putting on labor market reforms and wage flexibility. At the same time, since EMU 
countries are also characterized by quite different labor market institutions, it is 
reasonable to think that the institutional framework, together with 
macroeconomic developments, has an important impact on wages. 
Against this background, our paper studies the long-run determinants of real 
wages for EMU-11 countries, with a focus on labor market institutions. We extend 
a classic wage equation (Blanchard, 2000) to take into account the role of labor 
market regulation and wage bargaining. Thus, one important contribution of this 
paper is that it is the first work estimating equilibrium wage equations using 
cointegration that also accounts, in the long-run estimation, for institutional 
factors. Including institutional variables in the cointegration relation implies 
assuming that changes in the institutional set-up, for example a reform that 
increases the flexibility of the labor market, have permanent effects on the level of 
the real wage.  
                                                          
1 To name but a few, Nunziata (2005), Broersma et al. (2005), Marcellino and Mizon (2000), Alesina 
and Perotti (1997), Baltagi et al. (2000). 
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However, the main innovative feature of our analysis comes from the statistical 
design. We estimate the determinants of real wages using panel cointegration 
techniques that take into account the issue of cross-section dependence in the data 
and the presence of breaks in the series as well as in the cointegration relations. 
The issue of cross-section dependence is crucial when using macro data, especially 
for countries that are so much interlinked as EMU or OECD countries. Thus, we 
begin by testing for cross-section dependence using Pesaran’s (2004) CD test and 
for the presence of a unit root in the data using the panel unit root tests CADF 
proposed by Pesaran (2007) and PANIC (Bai and Ng, 2004), which allow for such 
dependence. Moreover, we test for cointegration between the variables using 
panel cointegration tests which allow for an (unknown) break in the equilibrium 
relations, in particular the ones proposed by Banerjee and Carrión-i-Silvestre 
(2013). This is extremely important, considering the institutional changes national 
labor market in the Euro Area have been going through during the last 20 years, 
not to mention the introduction of the euro. We also efficiently estimate the long-
run relationship (i.e. the wage equation) using the CUP-BC and CUP-FM estimators 
proposed in Bai et al. (2009), which correct for serial correlation and endogeneity. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on wage 
outcomes and labor market institutions; section 3 presents a stylized theoretical 
background; section 3 introduces the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 
presents the panel unit root and cointegration tests performed and their results 
and section 5 reports the results of the panel estimation of the long-run 
relationship. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review  
As we pointed out in the introduction, since the seminal work by Phillips (1958), 
the empirical literature has widely studied the relationship between 
unemployment and wages. Perhaps Sargan (1964) was the first one to interpret 
the Phillips curve as an adjustment mechanism around a long-run equilibrium 
relationship between the level of the wage and the unemployment rate. 
Nevertheless, while the relationship between unemployment and labor market 
institutions (LMI) has been largely investigated over the last couple of decades 
(see Nickell 1997, Belot and Van Ours 2000, Nickell et al. 2005, among others), less 
empirical work has been dedicated to the relationship between LMIs and wages. 
However, as pointed out by Nunziata (2005), if labor market institutions affect 
unemployment it must be so via their impact on the cost of labor. 
In their seminal work, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggested that the relationship 
between wage bargaining coordination and the real wage is nonlinear. In 
particular, both firm-level bargaining and economy-wide bargaining are associated 
with wage restraining, while intermediate (i.e. industry-level) bargaining is 
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associated with a higher equilibrium wage. Evidence in support of the Calmfors-
Driffill hypothesis was found, among others, by Nunziata (2005). He studies the 
determinants of labor costs in OECD countries over the period 1960-1994 
including a large vector of LMIs, finding that a more rigid labor market is 
associated with higher wages. Indeed, his work is similar in spirit to ours, although 
we focus on a different sample period and adopt a different empirical approach, 
estimating a “wage curve” à la Blanchflower and Oswald (1994).  
Other works focused more specifically on the effects of taxation on wages. For 
example, Alesina and Perotti (1997) find that the relationship between the tax 
wedge and wages is hump-shaped and, with highly centralized bargaining, unions 
internalize the benefits for welfare associated with tax increases, especially if the 
government is involved in the bargaining process, and thus moderate their wage 
claims. 
Nevertheless, the impact of labor market and wage bargaining institutions on the 
aggregate wage may change, at least to some extent, depending on the level of 
international competition and, therefore, the degree of openness of an economy. 
Egger and Etzel (2012) showed with a theoretical model that, while firms in more 
productive industries (and, thus, countries) pay higher wages, exporting lowers 
per worker profits because mark-ups on foreign markets are smaller. Thus, unions 
are more cautious about the negative effects of wage rises on employment and 
moderate their wage claims. These theoretical predictions are confirmed by 
Felbermayr et al. (2014), who find that a surge in the export intensity of collective 
bargaining plants is negatively correlated with wages.  
Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) study (nominal and real) wage flexibility in the 
EMU-12 between 1980 and 2005, finding that persistent differences in the 
evolution of labor costs and wage determination have prevented the necessary 
adjustment. They estimate the elasticity of the wage to unemployment to be 
around 0.3, i.e. an increase in unemployment of 1 p.p. is associated with a fall in the 
real wage of 0.3%. However, while they extensively discuss cross-country 
differences especially as far as wage rigidity is concerned, they do not attempt at 
accounting for the role of labor market institution, which are central to the present 
paper. 
 
3. Theoretical background 
In this section, we present a very stylized model of wage determination. We can 
interpret the observed real wage as the result of the bargaining process between 
employees’ unions and employers. On the labor supply side, employees’ unions 
tend to push for wage increases above productivity; however, their bargaining 
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power depends on the unemployment rate since wage demands by unions tend to 
be more moderate when unemployment is high. Thus, we can write 
       
   (            )   
 
    
     
     
     (1) 
where        
  is the (log) real wage on the labor supply side, measured as real 
compensation per hour worked;        is (log) labor productivity and        is 
the unemployment rate. The existence of a positive, but less than proportional, 
relationship between the level of the real wage and productivity, on one hand, and 
a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the real wage is, 
indeed, what is implied by Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1994) “wage curve” as well 
as matching models (see Blanchard and Katz, 1997). 
On the labor demand side, employers tend to constrain the real wage, maximizing 
their mark-up on unit labor costs, where the latter are defined as        
  
     . The mark-up that employers will be able to extract from the real wage will, 
in turn, be related to the real exchange rate, which can proxy the competitive 
pressure that national producers face on international goods markets. The real 
exchange rate can affect labor costs in different ways. First, a fall in the real 
exchange rate (i.e. depreciation) increases the demand for domestic goods, thus 
raising labor demand and the real wage (Campa and Goldberg 2001). We will call 
this channel the labor demand channel. Second, when the real exchange rate 
decreases, increasing the cost of imported final goods, induces workers to attempt 
to maintain their real net incomes, increasing wage pressure (employees’ pressure 
channel; Nunziata, 2005)2. Third, depreciation increases the price of imported 
intermediate goods and thus production costs; to the extent that those goods are 
complement to labor, it will foster a reduction in labor demand and in the real 
wage (imported intermediate goods channel; Robertson, 2003). Fourth, 
depreciation of the real exchange rate implies that imported goods are more 
expensive, which makes the consumer price index increase and real wage decline 
(imported inflation channel). If we define the real effective exchange rate as units 
of (trade-weighted) foreign goods per unit of domestic goods, the first and second 
channel would imply a negative relationship between         and the real 
exchange rate, while the third and fourth would imply a positive relationship. On 
the demand side, we can therefore write 
       
   (           )       (2)  
Where         ;       is the real exchange rate and therefore      
    
depending on which of the channels described above prevails.  
Finally, the observed equilibrium wage is the result of additional wage pressure 
factors, which can be more generally classified as wage setting institutions. In 
                                                          
2 Due to asymmetric behavior of employee following a fall or an increase in the real exchange rate, 
this channel is likely to be relevant only when the      depreciates. 
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particular, a more flexible labor market should be associated with wage restraint: 
by increasing the bargaining power of insiders, higher employment protection may 
put upward pressure on bargained wages. However, previous literature that 
estimated the effect of employment protection has been focusing more on its 
impact on employment than wages. Moreover, other institutional factors such as 
the degree of coordination in wage bargaining and the involvement of unions in 
government decisions also affect the equilibrium wage3.  
Therefore, combining the labor supply and demand side and in analogy with 
existing work (Nickell, 1998; Bell et al. 2002; Nunziata 2005), the long-run 
equilibrium wage equation can be written as a reduced-form specification suitable 
for estimation, incorporating both demand- and supply-side factors as well as 
institutional factors which may have an impact on the wage: 
                                                  (3) 
Where we expect, a priori,     ,      and     ;    is a vector of variables 
defining government policy actions that might affect the level of the wage and    is 
a vector of labor market institutions. While it is likely the case that      is 
endogenous in (3), our empirical approach in Section 5 will take this issue into 
account. 
In the empirical analysis, we will have that 
  
                                    (4) 
Where     is a “euro adoption” dummy,       represents government 
intervention in wage bargaining, TWED is the tax wedge and    (routine 
involvement of unions and employers in policy decisions) is the degree of 
concertation. If euro adoption has fostered an increase in real wages, for example 
due to convergence of countries with lower initial wages like Spain, Portugal and 
Italy, to countries with higher initial wages, we should expect     4. Government 
intervention may enhance wage moderation if the Government, acting as a social 
planner, is concerned about wage competitiveness. In this case, all else equal, a 
country with higher government intervention would have lower real wages. This is 
the case, for example, of the Netherlands, as pointed out by Borghans and Kriechel 
(2009). Therefore, we should expect     . Since we use net wages, the level of 
direct and indirect taxes, as well as social contributions, should ceteris paribus 
decrease the worker’s wage,     . Regarding the involvement of unions in 
                                                          
3 See Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Nunziata (2005), Boeri et al. (2001), among others. 
4 The rationale for expecting      is that a common currency makes comparison of nominal 
variables (i.e. prices and wages) easier. Therefore, as in inter-sectoral wage linkages models, 
workers in low-wage countries might push for higher wages due to social comparison and envy 
effects (Oswald 1979) or through the labor supply channel, moving where wages are higher 
(Demekas and Kontolemis 2000). 
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bargaining, from our discussion in section 2 we expect that      under high 
international competition. 
As far as labor market institutions are concerned, we have 
  
                                   (5) 
Where        is the degree of wage coordination (a higher        implies 
stronger coordination),      represents the degree of employment protection,    
is union density (i.e. the ratio of total union members to salaried employees)5, and 
    represents the minimum wage. 
According to the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) hypothesis, the relationship between 
centralization in wage bargaining (i.e.      ) and the aggregate wage is not 
linear. In particular, with dominant firm-level bargaining, wage claims have a 
direct effect on the firm’s competitiveness, and this will have a moderating effect 
on the unions’ claims. However, at the same time, with economy-level bargaining 
and thus maximum co-ordination in wage bargaining, unions will internalize the 
cost of excessive wage claims and this will have a moderating effect on the wage. 
For this reason, the relationship between       and the real wage should have 
an inverted-U shape. Our specification will not allow us to test for the Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) hypothesis; however, the expected sign of   depends on such 
hypothesis. In fact, since       in our data may take values from 1 (dominant 
firm-level bargaining) to 5 (dominant economy-wide bargaining)6 we can 
graphically represent the relationship between      and the real wage 
suggested by the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis as in Figure 2. Therefore, depending 
on whether the dominant level of wage bargaining within our sample is firm level 
(i.e.       ) or national level (       ),    will be positive or negative. 
Within our dataset, in all countries except France (also Ireland and Portugal, but 
for a very short period)      has always taken values between 3 and 5. 
Therefore, we are in the right-hand side of Calmfors and Driffill’s inverted-U curve. 
Based on this discussion, we would therefore expect     . As far as      is 
concerned, instead, from the previous discussion we should expect stricter 
employment protection to result in higher wages, ceteris paribus and thus       
Since higher Union Density increases unions’ bargaining power, it is often assumed 
that        However, this does not necessarily translate into higher wages. In fact, 
as discussed by Checchi and Nunziata (2011), national union leaders may 
internalize the effect of excessive wage pressure, and especially so when 
centralization is high, as it is the case in EMU-11 countries. In this sense, higher 
                                                          
5 We use Union Density in place of bargaining coverage. We aware that bargaining coverage is the 
variable that affects real wage determination in the long-run; in fact, with higher coverage, wage 
increases are extended to a bigger pool of workers. However, UD is also a proxy of Unions’ strength: 
the rationale is that we would expect Unions’ bargaining power to be stronger if they represent a 
higher share of workers. Moreover, available data on bargaining coverage are of poorer quality. 
6 See Appendix 1 for details. 
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Union Density may trigger wage moderation and     . We will come back to this 
point in Section 6. 
Finally, as it is robustly found in the literature, we expect that the higher the 
minimum wage (or, the wider the coverage of minimum wage setting across 
sectors), the higher the aggregate wage, i.e.     . 
 
4. The Data  
We use quarterly data from 1995Q1 until 2011Q4 on the group of countries 
generally referred to as EMU-11: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain7. Macroeconomic data 
comes from Eurostat and the variables are all seasonally and working day 
adjusted. The wage is defined as employees’ compensation per worker, and is 
therefore calculated as the (log) difference of total compensation and number of 
persons employed: 
          (        )     (     ) 
Productivity is calculated as output per worker, and therefore is the difference 
between the log of GDP and the log of persons employed. 
Institutional variables come from J. Visser’s ICTWSS database and the OECD8. The 
ICTWSS database provides annual data on 34 countries (all our countries are 
included in the database) about trade unionism, wage setting, state intervention 
and social pacts from 1960 to 2012.  
Remember, from equation (3), that we have two groups of institutional variables: 
government policy and labor market institutions.  
There are four “Government policy” variables:    ,     ,       and   .     is 
a dummy indicating euro adoption (i.e. taking a value of 1 since 1999Q1, and zero 
before that).     , the tax wedge, includes taxes and social contributions (net of 
subsidies) that create a wedge between the wage cost for the employer and what is 
actually earned by the employee.       is an index variable indicating 
government intervention in wage bargaining: it goes from 1 (the government does 
not intervene in wage bargaining) to 5 when the government imposes private 
sector wage settlements.    is routine involvement of employers and unions in 
wage bargaining, i.e. it represents the “concertation system”. It is equal to zero 
when no concertation is present, up to 2 in the case of full concertation.  
                                                          
7 
The other current member states of the EMU were excluded due to lack of data on a quarterly 
basis, or because the available time series were too short. 
8 
EPL is not available for Luxembourg, which was therefore excluded from the institutional analysis. 
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Furthermore, we include five variables describing the institutional setting of the 
labor market:     ,    ,   and   .      is a discrete variable going 
from 1 (full decentralization, i.e. firm-level bargaining) to 5 (full coordination, i.e. 
economy-wide bargaining).     indicates the degree of employment protection. 
This variable goes from 0 to 5 and is constructed by the OECD using several 
indicators of labor market rigidity. In the current edition (2013) the OECD only 
provides separate indicators for temporary and permanent contracts. Therefore, 
following the guidelines of the previous (2009) edition, we reconstructed the 
overall indicator as an unweighted average of employment protection of 
permanent and temporary workers.   , i.e. union density, is the share of 
employees who are members of a union. Finally,    is a discrete variable 
indicating minimum wage setting: it is equal to 0 when there is no national 
minimum wage, to 8 when the minimum wage is set by the government (i.e. the 
minimum wage covers all sectors and is not a result of bargaining among 
employers and employees). Other works that estimate a wage equation, for 
example Nunziata (2005), actually use a measure of the minimum wage relative to 
the median (or average) aggregate wage, finding a positive impact of the minimum 
wage on the aggregate wage. However, some of the countries in our sample do not 
have a minimum wage, or did not have one over some of the sample period, which 
would significantly reduce our sample size. For this reason, we choose to look at 
the effect of the minimum wage from a different angle. 
Note that, since both ICTWSS and OECD institutional data are annual, we had to 
transform them to quarterly: to that end, we used quadratic interpolation for    
and     ; for the other institutional variables, whenever a change in the annual 
series was present, we looked for a corresponding reform or regulatory 
intervention within the year and thus constructed the quarterly series: dates of 
labor market reforms and collective agreements were taken from European 
Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and Economic 
Policy Committee LABREF database.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables involved. A detailed description 
of the variables and data sources is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
5. Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 
We first applied Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test (CD Test 
henceforth) to the variables. This test is formulated having as null hypothesis 
cross-section independence, so that its rejection would mean that dependence is 
found among the individual countries in the group and should be accounted for in 
10 
 
the remaining panel tests. This is the case for the four variables in Table 2: the null 
hypothesis of independence is clearly rejected9.  
 
Once we have found the presence of dependence in the variables, we have studied 
their order of integration using two different tests that account for dependence. 
Both are representative of the “second generation” panel unit root tests10.  
 
First, we apply Pesaran’s (2007) CADF test. In this case, unlike previous tests that 
demeaned the series to correct for the existence of dependence among the 
members of a panel, he augments the standard DF or ADF regressions with the 
cross-section averages of the lagged levels as well as the first differences of the 
individual series. Based on this procedure, he suggests developing modified 
versions of the t-bar test of Im et al. (2003) IPS test, the inverse chi-squared test 
(the P test) of Maddala and Wu (1999), and the inverse normal Z test suggested by 
Choi (2001). Pesaran (2007) defines the test statistics for the model with constant, 
with trend and with constant and trend.  The main advantage of Pesaran’s CADF 
test is that is simple and intuitive. Moreover, it is also valid for panels where N and 
T are of the same order of magnitude. This is frequently the case of panel unit roots 
applied to macro-variables.   
 
Second, we also apply Bai and Ng (2004), a suitable approach when cross-
correlation is pervasive, as in this case. Furthermore, this approach controls for 
cross-section dependence given by cross-cointegration relationships, potentially 
possible among our group of countries and variables — see Banerjee et al. (2004). 
This is clearly the case for wages, but also for the real effective exchange rate.  
 
Bai and Ng (2004) make use of residual factor models to take account of 
dependence. From a rather general set-up, they allow for the possibility of unit 
roots and cointegration in the common factors. However, they still assume that 
N/T 0, as N and T  1. They apply the principal component procedure to the 
first-differenced version of the model. Then, they estimate the factor loadings as 
well as the first differences of the common factors. 
 
They decompose Yi,t,  as follows: 
 
Yi,t = Di,t + Ft’ πi + ei,t, 
 
with t = 1, . . . , T , i = 1, . . . , N, where Di,t denotes the deterministic part of the model 
— either a constant or a linear time trend — Ft is a (r x1)-vector that accounts for 
                                                          
9 The test was performed in Stata using the xtcd code provided by Markus Eberhardt in his 
webpage. 
10 See Breitung and Pesaran (2007) and Choi (2006) for a review of second-generation panel unit 
root tests. 
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the common factors that are present in the panel, and ei,t is the idiosyncratic 
disturbance term, which is assumed to be cross-section independent. As stated 
above, unobserved common factors and idiosyncratic disturbance terms are 
estimated using principal components on the first difference model. For the 
estimated idiosyncratic component, they propose an ADF test for individual unit 
roots and a Fisher-type test for the pooled unit root hypothesis (Pê ), which has a 
standard normal distribution. The estimation of the number of common factors is 
obtained using the panel BIC information criterion as suggested by Bai and Ng 
(2002), with a maximum of six common factors.  
 
Bai and Ng (2004) propose several tests to select the number of independent 
stochastic trends, k1 in the estimated common factors,  ̂ . If a single common factor 
is estimated, they recommend an ADF test whereas if several common factors are 
obtained, they propose an iterative procedure to select k1: two modified Q statistics 
(MQc and MQf), that use a non-parametric and a parametric correction respectively 
to account for additional serial correlation. Both statistics have a non-standard 
limiting distribution. The null hypothesis of k1 = m is tested against the alternative 
k1 < m for m starting from  ̂. The procedure ends if at any step k1 = m cannot be 
rejected.  
 
The results of the Pesaran (2007) and Bai and Ng (2004) tests are presented Table 
311. The headings CADF(4)C and CADF(4)T correspond, respectively, to Pesaran’s 
(2007) model with constant and with trend, where the number of lags chosen is 
p=4. The null hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected for any of the variables 
analysed in the case of the model with constant. When the specification includes a 
trend, the unit root null is rejected for the real effective exchange rate. The right-
hand side of the table is devoted to the results of Bai and Ng (2004) panel unit root 
test. The number of chosen common factors is the maximum (six) for the two 
statistics and the first three variables. The exception this time is unemployment, 
where two factors are found in MQC and three in MQf. Concerning the unit root 
tests, we find rejection in the idiosyncratic ADF test for the unemployment rate (at 
5%), whereas, according to the MQ tests all the common components are non-
stationary.  
 
Given our a priori theoretical expectations as exposed in section 2, we are looking 
for an equilibrium relationship between wages, productivity, the unemployment 
rate and the real (effective) exchange rate, which can then be augmented to include 
institutional variables as in equation (3). 
Thus, the next step in our empirical strategy is to test for cointegration applying 
the Banerjee and Carrión-i-Silvestre (2013) test12. Using factor models to account 
                                                          
11 The test was performed using Piotr Lewandowski’s pescadf.ado Stata code. 
12
 See Appendix 2 for a description of the specified models and the test. 
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for cross-section dependence, they propose a panel test for the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration allowing for breaks both in the deterministic components and in 
the cointegrating vector. It is worth noticing that inference concerning the 
presence of cointegration can be affected by misspecification if the existence of 
breaks is ignored. They propose a test formulated for six different specifications of 
the deterministic components including a constant, a trend and structural breaks. 
They then recover the idiosyncratic disturbance terms ( ̃  ) through accumulation 
of the estimated residuals and test for the null of no cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration with breaks using the ADF statistic. In our case we 
concentrate in models with common homogenous structural breaks. 
As shown in Table 4, using the Banerjee and Carrion (2013) to test for non-
cointegration, we apply the statistic based on the accumulated idiosyncratic 
components, Zj*. We present the test for all possible specifications; in all cases the 
null hypothesis of non-cointegration is rejected. Moreover, according to the 
information criteria13, the appropriate model could be either Model 3 (constant 
and trend restricted in the cointegration relation, and a break in both) or Model 6 
(the break affects the level, the trend and the cointegrating vector, i.e. a “regime 
break”). The break is found to be in 2004Q2 in Model 3 and 2004Q4 using Model 
614. The Banerjee and Carrion (2013) test thus suggests that the preferred models 
include a trend in the cointegration relation. While including a linear term in the 
equilibrium relationship may be criticized since it is difficult to interpret 
economically, on the other hand it allows us to define the cointegration as one 
between the real wage and trend-adjusted productivity (plus other variables), 
where the trend proxies technological progress15.   
 
6. The wage equation of the EMU 
 
6.1. A break in the constant and the trend 
Following the results of the Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013) test, we 
estimated equation (3) using the CUP-FM (continuously-updated and fully-
modified) and CUP-BC (continuously-updated and bias-corrected) estimators (Bai 
et al., 2009) for the model with a break in the deterministic components (Model 3).  
These estimators present several advantages: they are valid when some or all of 
                                                          
13
 Using AIC we would have chosen Model 6, whereas according to BIC the best specification would 
be Model 3. Therefore, we present the results for both models. Moreover, the comparison between 
the two models is also interesting, as Model 8 allows for a structural change in the cointegrating 
relationship. The information criteria results are available from the authors upon request. 
14 We will discuss on the interpretation of this date in the following section. 
15 Moreover, including a linear term is a standard procedure in cointegration analysis when the 
variables included seem to exhibit a deterministic trend, other tan a stochastic trend, and the slope 
of such trend is different across variables. In this case, excluding the trend from the cointegration 
relation may leave us with residual non-stationarity. See also Juselius (2006). 
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the common factors are stationary, and also when some of the regressors are 
stationary; moreover, they are consistent since they correct for serial correlation 
and endogeneity, which is likely to be present in (3).  
The results are reported in Table 5 and 6 for equation (2), using a specification 
without and with institutional variables, respectively. 
First of all, let us consider Table 5, where the results of the cointegration analysis 
of the base wage equation, i.e. including macroeconomic variables     ,       
and      only, are reported. All coefficients have the expected sign (and 
magnitude) and are significant at all significance levels. In particular, the 
coefficient of      is positive and lower than 1, i.e. productivity increases have a 
positive effect on the wage in the long run, but less than proportional. 
Unemployment has a negative relationship in the long run with the real wage. 
Interestingly, the estimated long-run elasticity of the real wage to unemployment 
is close to that estimated by Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007). Finally, the coefficient 
for      is positive and significant: an increase in the real exchange rate fosters an 
increase in the real wage, thus the “imported inflation channel” and the “imported 
intermediate goods channel” indicated in section 3 prevail over the “labor 
demand” and the “employees’ pressure” channel. 
We then have included institutional variables in our cointegration analysis, and the 
results of the estimation are reported in Table 6.  
We adopt a general-to-specific approach: in Table 6, we first estimate the model 
including all institutional variables. Then, we eliminate the coefficients with the 
lowest t-values one at a time as long as they were not significant with neither of 
the estimators. In particular, we estimate the models including, alternatively, (i) 
      and (ii)  , because the two variables appear to be collinear. More 
precisely, the impact of unions’ bargaining power on wages is likely to be 
compensated by coordination.16  
In the first two columns of Table 6, we report the results of the full specification. 
Since the tax wedge,     and    do not affect the long-run real wage in a 
significant way, we removed them from the model and we report the results of the 
estimation with selected variables in the last two columns of Table 6. 
In all cases, the previous results on productivity, unemployment and the real 
exchange rate found in Table 5 are confirmed, although the coefficient of 
productivity is not always significant in (ii). 
Interestingly, we find a positive and significant coefficient to euro adoption: 
according to our model, the adoption of the euro made the real aggregate wage 
increase by 3-5% depending on the specification. This might be due, for example, 
                                                          
16 See Nunziata (2005),  Nickell and Layard (1999) and Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors (2001). 
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to a catch-up in the nominal wages in lower-wage countries (Portugal, Spain and 
Italy) to those of the “core” of the EMU. 
All institutional variables have the expected sign:        has a negative and 
significant coefficient, supporting the idea that a government acting as a social 
planner (concerned about wage competitiveness) might foster wage moderation; a 
wider or more centralized system for minimum wages increases the equilibrium 
real wage (the coefficient of    is positive and significant), while higher 
coordination in wage bargaining (higher     ) is associated with a lower long-
run real wage, given that the coefficient is negative. This confirms again our prior 
expectation of being “located” in the right-hand side of Calmfors and Driffill’s 
inverted-U curve. In this sense, higher centralization of wage bargaining would 
bring about a drop in real wages. 
Union Density (  ) deserves a specific comment. The variable presents a long-run 
negative coefficient. This goes against what the a priori expectation suggesting that 
the relationship should be positive: the higher Union Density, the higher the 
bargaining power of unions and therefore the aggregate wage. On the other hand, 
this confirms the opposite view that Union leaders may internalize the cost of 
excessive wage increases, as discussed in section 2 and suggested by Checchi and 
Nunziata (2011). In this sense, above a certain threshold of union density, an 
increase in it may trigger wage moderation, a result which is consistent with 
Checchi and Lucifora’s (2002) “good” view of unions, i.e. of unions being welfare-
enhancing. Note, moreover, that when   is included in place of      the 
coefficient of       drops. This might be due to the fact that, as suggested by 
Booth (1984), if unions are able to obtain preferential treatment for their 
members, and workers are heterogeneous in terms of risk aversion, other things 
equal an increase in aggregate unemployment risk raises union density (Booth 
1984): thus, there might be a positive relationship between   and      .17 
6.2. A structural break 
The Banerjee and Carrion (2013) test performed in section 4 suggested that a 
structural break might be present in our relationship. Therefore, we proceed with 
the estimation of the wage equation including a change in long-run coefficient at 
the suggested date, 2004Q4. If a regime change is present, our estimates in Tables 
5 and 6 would be inconsistent because we are simply averaging across two 
regimes. Table 7 reports the results of the estimation of the base model with a 
structural break. Indeed, the story is quite different with respect to Table 5. Note 
that, since the break is represented by a dummy that is equal to one from 2004Q4 
                                                          
17 Nevertheless, there is not a problem of multicollinearity here. Note that the literature on the 
determinants of union membership is, however, unsettled on the relationship between    and 
     . An alternative view suggests that, with high unemployment, unions are less able to 
influence firms’ layoff decisions and therefore the incentive to join them is weaker (Boeri et al. 
2001) 
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onwards, which is then interacted with all the model variables, the value of the 
long-run coefficient of variable   after the break is given by the sum of the 
coefficients on   and        .  
While we still have coefficients with the expected sign, we find that (i) the impact 
of productivity on the long-run real wage before 2004 was lower or even not 
significant, and it became clearly positive and significant afterwards; (ii) as far as 
the real exchange rate is concerned, a negative sign prevails since 2004: therefore, 
the “labor demand” and “employee pressure” channel dominated the others. In this 
sense, since 2004, wages appear to have been more sensitive to competitiveness 
changes due to real appreciation/depreciation, since a real appreciation triggered 
a drop in the long-run wage. We will come back to this point towards the end of the 
section.  
In Table 8, we show the results of the estimation of the wage equation with 
institutional variables including a structural break. Previous results (Table 7) for 
productivity, unemployment and the real exchange rate are confirmed. Also the 
dummy “euro adoption” has the same value as in Table 5, and is significant. 
Looking at the coefficients of institutional variables, we find now a significant role 
of EPL: employment protection has a positive long-run effect on wages, as we 
would expect, although only in the second half of the sample, as well as        
with the expected negative sign. Moreover, our estimates suggest a stronger 
impact of MWS and after the break (the coefficient of          is significant 
and positive). While government intervention has been wage restraining in the 
first part of the sample, after the break it is likely to have become insignificant. 
Interestingly, instead, concertation, that is, involvement of unions in economic 
policy decisions, which was pushing wages up in the first half of the sample, was 
wage-restraining after the break.  
These results are very interesting because they all seem to point to the same 
direction. First of all, it is honestly difficult to interpret the 2004 break simply as 
far as the labor market is concerned. Indeed, the year was characterized by the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU, which was then completed in 2007 with the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria. This supposedly brought about two shocks, on 
the goods production side and on the labor supply side. On one hand, firms in the 
Euro Area-11 (and, more generally, in the European Union-15) found themselves 
with increased product market competition due to the removal of all barriers vis à 
vis Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), although most of the process of trade 
barriers removal had already been completed in the previous years. On the other 
hand, free labor mobility from the CEE countries affected labor supply.  
At the same time, the degree of openness of EMU-11 economies has largely 
increased over the sample period. Figure 3 shows the degree of openness of EMU-
11 countries in the two subperiods we identified, and it is easy to see that in 2004-
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2012 it was considerably higher for all countries except Ireland (where it was 
almost unchanged). In the case of Germany, openness increased as much as 43%, 
going from 59% of GDP up to 84%,  With firms facing increased international 
competition, it is realistic to think that wage bargaining was less influenced by 
domestic factors like unions’ bargaining power and labor market institutions, and 
therefore wage developments became more strictly linked to productivity 
developments (the coefficient on productivity became positive and significant), in 
an attempt to keep unit labor costs stable; this would explain a wage-moderating 
effect of concertation mechanisms as well as the change of sign of the coefficient of 
the real exchange rate, as discussed above. 
6.3. Robustness checks 
One might argue that, due to second-round effects of wages on prices, the wage 
affects the real exchange rate and competitiveness as well, and that therefore a 
problem of simultaneity between the real exchange rate and wages in our model 
may be present. While our empirical approach takes endogeneity into account, in 
this section we take a more radical approach by replacing      with the nominal 
effective exchange rate,     18. Indeed, in this respect, we acknowledge that what 
matters for competitiveness is not the nominal exchange rate, but rather the real 
exchange rate. However, due to price stickiness, movements in the real exchange 
rate in the short-medium run are driven by nominal exchange rate developments; 
plus, there is a quite strong positive correlation between the two variables within 
our sample (about 0.5). Finally, while nominal exchange rate developments, 
affecting the real exchange rate, may in principle affect the real wage, it can hardly 
be argued that the reverse is true. Therefore, as a robustness check to estimate the 
relationship between exchange rates and wages as discussed in Section 2, we use 
the nominal instead of the real effective exchange rate19.  
The results of this robustness check are reported in Table 9, for the model with no 
institutional variables and with selected institutional variables20. The robustness 
checks confirm our previous results, albeit with some slight differences. When we 
replace the real exchange rate with the nominal effective rate, all results discussed 
in 5.2 are confirmed. As far as the relationship between the exchange rate and the 
                                                          
18 The nominal effective exchange rate is the weighted average of nominal exchange rates with 
trade partners. Since countries in our sample share have irrevocably fixed the exchange rates with 
each other since 1998Q2, cross-country differences in the evolution of the      will only be due to 
differences in the shares of international trade of their trade partners, and how the euro exchange 
rate with those trade partners have evolved. Indeed, the cross-country correlation is quite high, 
although it ranges from 0.70 (Italy/Luxembourg) to 0.99 (Belgium/Netherlands). Nevertheless, our 
approach takes cross-sectional dependence into account. 
19 As in Section 4 above, we first performed the cross-section dependence CD test and the PANIC 
unit root test on     . We rejected cross-section independence at all significance levels with the 
former, while we could not reject the existence of a unit root with the latter. Detailed results are 
available upon request. 
20 We only report, for brevity, the results using Model 6 (Structural break). 
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wage is concerned, it is negative throughout the sample; however, the “wage-
restraining” role of the exchange rate becomes significantly stronger after 2004, 
thus confirming our results obtained in the initial model using the real exchange 
rate, and this result is confirmed both in the model including      and that 
including   . 
 
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have estimated an equilibrium wage equation for the Euro Area 
over the period 1995-2011 using panel cointegration techniques which take into 
account the issue of cross-section dependence in the data and the presence of 
breaks in the series and in the cointegration relations. Moreover, we have also 
included institutional variables in the long-run equation, in order to show how a 
different design of the labor market, and government policies may be consistent 
with wage moderation. 
The cointegration techniques adopted in the present work allowed us to include a 
break in the long-run relationships. The break was found to be in 2004 (second or 
fourth quarter, depending on the chosen model). While, on one hand, it does not 
seem possible to identify a specific event that triggered this break, on the other 
hand, the way that the wage equation was affected is very clear: increased labor 
market flexibility and increased international competition made the long-run real 
wage more productivity-determined; moreover, the wage tended to adjust to 
compensate for real exchange rate appreciations (i.e. it dropped when the real 
exchange rate was above equilibrium) and concertation mechanisms were wage-
moderating. Finally, subsequent labor market reforms have restrained the real 
wage. 
This last result confirms previous works similar to ours, suggesting that a more 
flexible labor market is consistent with wage moderation and, therefore, lower 
equilibrium unemployment. 
We argued in section 6 that increased product competition coming from 
international trade, as well as higher international labor mobility, both presumably 
resulting from the 2004 EU eastern enlargement, may have a role in explaining this 
break, together with the rapid increase in the degree of trade openness of each of 
the Euro Area-11 countries, except Ireland, over the sample period. Indeed, the 
changes in the cointegration vector implied by the 2004 regime break, suggest that 
firms (and unions) became more concerned with the impact that real wage 
increases have on competitiveness. 
Finally, our results have an additional, more general implication which is related to 
the Lucas (1976) critique: it is crucial to account for a break in the estimation of 
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the long run real wage equation; failure to do so may reduce the power of 
cointegration tests, as discussed in the literature (see also Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre 2013), and it may also lead to a misinterpretation of the estimated 
coefficients, as our discussion has demonstrated.  
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Appendix A. Series definition  
       unemployment rate. Source: Eurostat. 
          total compensation of employees. Source: Eurostat. 
       thousands of persons employed. Source: Eurostat.  
      ULC-deflated real effective exchange rate. Source: IFS. 
      Nominal Effective Exchange Rate. Source: Eurostat. 
       Coordination of wage bargaining. 5: economy-wide bargaining; 4: 
mixed industry- and economy-wide; ... 1= company-level 
bargaining. Source: ICTWSS Database.  
     Employment Protection Legislation. 0 = minimum employment 
protection; 5 = maximum employment protection. Source: OECD.  
        real compensation per employee: 
  (        ) –    (     ) –    (   ). CPI is seasonally adjusted 
using TRAMO/SEATS,  
      labor productivity per worker:   (   ) –    (     ) 
    union density (in %). Source: ICTWSS Database. 
       Government intervention in wage bargaining 
    Routine involvement of unions and employers in government 
decisions on social and economic policy. Discrete variable going 
from 0 (no concertation) to 1 (partial/infrequent concertation) to 2 
(full, regular concertation). Source: ICTWSS Database. 
     Minimum wage setting. 0 = no minimum wage ... 8 = minimum wage 
is set by government, with no fixed rule. Source: ICTWSS Database. 
      Tax wedge. Constructed as: (direct taxes/employees compensation) 
+ (indirect taxes – subsidies)/private consumption expenditure + 
(social security contributions)/(employees’ compensation – social 
security contributions). Source: AMECO, Eurostat and our 
calculations. 
 
Appendix B – The Banerjee and Carrion (2013) Cointegration Test with 
breaks and dependence 
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013) propose a panel test for the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration allowing for breaks both in the deterministic 
components and in the cointegrating vector, also accounting for the presence of 
cross-section dependence using factor models. They define a (m x 1) vector of non-
stationary stochastic process,     (       ) whose elements are individually I(1) 
with the following Data Generating Process: 
                    (A.1) 
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The general functional form for the deterministic term     is given by: 
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 ∑        
  
   
 
 
(A.2) 
Where        and      (     
 )  for      
  and 0 otherwise,    
     
    
denotes the timing of the j-th break, j = 1,…, mi, for the i-th unit, i = 1,…, N,    
    , 
being   a closed subset of (0,1). The cointegrating vector is a function of time so 
that  
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 (A.3) 
 
with    
    and      
   , where    
     
    denoting the j-th time of the break, j 
= 1,…,ni, for the i-th unit, i =1,…,N, for the    th unit,             
   .  
Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013) propose six different model specifications: 
Model 1., No linear trend - ϴij  = i = i,j = 0        in (A.2) – and stable cointegrating 
vector -            in [A.3].  
Model 2. Stable trend - ϴij = 0; i  0 i  and i,j = 0        in (A.2) – and stable 
cointegrating vector  -            in [A.3]. 
Model 3. Changes in level and trend - ϴij 0; i  i,j  0      in (A.2) – and 
stable cointegrating vector -            in [A.3].  
Model 4. No linear trend -  i = i,j = 0        in (A.2) but presence of multiple 
structural breaks that affect both the level and the cointegrating vector of the 
model.  
Model 5. Stable trend i  0 i  and i,j = 0        in (A.2) with multiple structural 
breaks that affect both the level and the cointegrating vector of the model.  
Model 6. Changes in the level, trend and in the cointegrating vector.  No 
constraints are imposed on the parameters of equations (A.2) and (A.3). 
The common factors are estimated following the method proposed by Bai and Ng 
(2004). They start by computing the first difference of the model; then, they take 
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the orthogonal projections and estimate the common factors and the factor 
loadings using principal components.  
In any of these specifications, Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013) recover the 
idiosyncratic disturbance terms ( ̃  ) through accumulation of the estimated 
residuals and propose testing for the null of no cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration with break using the ADF statistic. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root can be tested using the pseudo t-ratio 
  ̃
  (  )        . The models that do not include a time trend (Models 1 and 4) 
are denoted by c. Those that include a linear time trend with stable trend (Models 
2, and 5) are denoted by   and, finally,  refers to the models with a time trend with 
changing trend (Models 3 and 6). When common (homogeneous) structural breaks 
are imposed to all the units of the panel (although with different magnitudes), we 
can compute the statistic for the break dates, where the break dates are the same 
for each unit, using the idiosyncratic disturbance terms. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics 
 N. Obs. mean standard dev. 
       739 2.945 0.817 
      748 0.077 0.035 
     748 1.481 0.116 
     748 0.987 0.052 
   724 0.331 0.178 
    696 2.334 0.739 
      748 3.464 1.015 
    748 4.398 2.856 
      746 3.177 0.907 
     731 0.406 0.185 
   748 1.360 0.655 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Pesaran’s (2004) Cross-Section Dependence CD Test 
 CD Test Statistic P-value 
         32.27 0.000 
       34.19 0.000 
       7.78 0.000 
        18.61 0.000 
Note: Null hypothesis states that series are cross-section independent. CD ~ N(0,1) under H0. 
 
TABLE 3 
Panel unit Root Tests 
 CADF(4)C CADF(4)T rc MQc rf MQf 
Idiosync. 
ADF 
         0.497 
(0.690) 
3.163 
(0.999) 
6 -46.062 6 -44.375 
0.867 
(0.807) 
       -1.573 
(0.058) 
-2.390 
(0.008) 
6 -53.960 6 -54.128 
0.353 
(0.638) 
       0.065 
(0.526) 
3.692 
(1.000) 
6 -41.309 6 -40.407 
1.008 
(0.843) 
        0.275 
(0.608) 
1.853 
(0.968) 
6 -46.841 6 -48.955 
-2.164 
(0.015) 
P-values in parenthesis. Critical Values for the MQ statistic are tabulated by Bai and Ng (2004), Table 
I.rc is the number of common factors in MQC; rf is the number of common factors in MQf. The last 
column represents the unit root test on the idiosyncratic component as in Bai and Ng (2004). 
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TABLE 4 
Banerjee and Carrion (2013) panel cointegration tests 
 
 
 f(prodijt, reerijt, 
unempijt) 
Model 
 
AIC BIC 
1 -6.85 -8.71 -8.55 
2 -5.82 -8.78 -8.58 
3 -4.72 -8.96 -8.67 
4 -6.19 -8.53 -8.21 
5 -5.41 -8.68 -8.31 
6 -4.25 -8.99 -8.58 
 
Note: Critical values of the Zj* are -2.824, -2.113 and -1.759 at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively, for the model with constant, whereas -2.924, -2.240 and -1.835 are their equivalents in the model 
with trend. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Estimation of the long run parameters – Base Long-Run Model 
 
 CUP - FM CUP - BC 
       0.550*** (3.770) 0.725*** (4.839) 
       0.322*** (7.890) 0.313*** (7.716) 
        -0.384*** (-4.446) -0.387*** (-4.480) 
Absolute t-values in parenthesis. All models are estimated with 2 factors, as suggested by PCA. The 
bandwidth was chosen using Silverman’s rule of thumb. *** : significant at 1%, ** : at 5%, *: at 10% . 
 
  
  
Z j
*
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TABLE 6 
Estimation of the long run model including institutions 
 Full Specification (i) Full Specification (ii) Selected Variables (i) Selected Variables (ii) 
 CUP - FM CUP – BC CUP – FM CUP - BC CUP - FM CUP - BC CUP - FM CUP - BC 
       0.296** 
(2.069) 
0.366** 
(2.534) 
0.136 
(0.906) 
0.194 
(1.273) 
0.382*** 
(2.693) 
0.477*** 
(3.346) 
0.208 
(1.389) 
0.288* 
(1.898) 
       0.257*** 
(5.744) 
0.228*** 
(5.098) 
0.286*** 
(6.394) 
0.279*** 
(6.237) 
0.226*** 
(5.314) 
0.223*** 
(5.234) 
0.260*** 
(6.090) 
0.280*** 
(6.557) 
        -0.426*** 
(-4.810) 
-0.421*** 
(-4.750) 
-0.199** 
(-2.275) 
-0.172** 
(-1.961) 
-0.435*** 
(-4.912) 
-0.466*** 
(-5.262) 
-0.201** 
(-2.305) 
-0.207** 
(-2.372) 
     0.044*** 
(4.857) 
0.034*** 
(3.681) 
0.054** 
(5.986) 
0.047*** 
(5.175) 
0.041*** 
(4.534) 
0.028*** 
(3.062) 
0.051*** 
(5.650) 
0.041*** 
(4.551) 
        -0.009*** 
(-3.777) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.595) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.776) 
-0.012*** 
(-5.111) 
-0.008*** 
(3.445) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.004) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.752) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.663) 
       0.029 
(1.614) 
-0.009 
(0.496) 
0.025 
(1.398) 
0.007 
(0.403) 
    
     0.002 
(0.438) 
0.009 
(0.988) 
0.002 
(0.363) 
0.006 
(1.128) 
    
      0.002 
(0.949) 
0.005 
(0.603) 
0.002 
(0.835) 
0.001 
(0.559) 
    
        -0.014*** 
(-3.707) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.885) 
  -0.014*** 
(-3.767) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.174) 
  
       -0.061*** 
(-3.110) 
-0.047** 
(-2.396) 
  -0.061*** 
(-3.089) 
-0.048** 
(-2.429) 
      0.007*** 
(3.795) 
0.007*** 
(3.849) 
0.008*** 
(4.401) 
0.008*** 
(4.064) 
0.008*** 
(4.127) 
0.008***  
(4.336) 
0.008*** 
(4.728) 
0.009*** 
(4.603) 
Absolute t-values in parenthesis. Models are estimated with 2 factors, as suggested by PCA. Bandwidth chosen using Silverman’s rule of thumb. ***: significant at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 
10% . 
  
27 
 
TABLE 7 
Base long-run model – Structural break 
 CUP - FM CUP - BC 
       0.204 (1.442) 0.249* (1.736) 
       0.391*** (8.841) 0.394*** (8.925) 
        -0.580*** (-5.459) -0.571*** (-5.398) 
              0.244*** (7.139) 0.238*** (6.992) 
              -0.687*** (-5.601) -0.610*** (-4.895) 
               0.262** (2.151) 0.256** (2.113) 
Dependent variable is       . Absolute t-values in parenthesis. All models are estimated with 2 factors, as suggested by PCA. The bandwidth was chosen using 
Silverman’s rule of thumb. *** : significant at 1%, ** : at 5%, *: at 10% . 
 
TABLE 8 
Full long-run model – Structural break 
 Full Specification (1) Full Specification (2) Selected Variables (1) Selected Variables (2) 
 CUP - FM CUP - BC CUP – FM CUP - BC CUP - FM CUP - BC CUP - FM CUP - BC 
       -0.017 
(-0.129) 
-0.108 
(-0.768) 
-0.009 
(-0.067) 
-0.150 
(-1.055) 
0.013 
(0.110) 
-0.092 
(-0.655) 
0.010 
(0.079) 
-0.141 
(-0.992) 
       0.267*** 
(5.621) 
0.212*** 
(4.367) 
0.269*** 
(5.798) 
0.235*** 
(4.962) 
0.232*** 
(4.962) 
0.208*** 
(4.376) 
0.260*** 
(5.706) 
0.243*** 
(5.223) 
        
-0.597*** 
(-4.976) 
-0.754*** 
(-6.112) 
-0.353*** 
(3.045) 
-0.540*** 
(-4.502) 
-0.606*** 
(-5.033) 
-0.750*** 
(-6.060) 
-0.350*** 
(-3.000) 
-0.530*** 
(-4.467) 
     0.055*** 
(6.326) 
0.024*** 
(2.764) 
0.057*** 
(6.902) 
0.030*** 
(3.579) 
0.053*** 
(6.115) 
0.024*** 
(2.736) 
0.058*** 
(6.952) 
0.030*** 
(3.642) 
        -0.023*** 
(-4.886) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.862) 
-0.014*** 
(3.154) 
-0.020*** 
(4.266) 
-0.022*** 
(4.571) 
-0.024*** 
(4.827) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.952) 
-0.020*** 
(-4.298) 
       0.024 
(2.425) 
0.010 
(1.623) 
0.004 
(0.252) 
-0.004 
(-0.238) 
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     0.014** 
(1.497) 
0.009 
(0.532) 
0.015*** 
(2.636) 
0.009 
(1.529) 
0.015** 
(2.522) 
0.010 
(1.644) 
0.015*** 
(2.628) 
0.008 
(1.462) 
      0.001 
(0.596) 
0.009 
(0.424) 
0.003 
(1.266) 
0.001 
(0.672) 
  
  
        -0.010** 
(-1.985) 
-0.011** 
(-2.110)   
-0.010** 
(-2.098) 
-0.010** 
(-2.081)   
       -0.212*** 
(-5.993) 
-0.162*** 
(-4.418) 
  -0.211*** 
(-5.946) 
-0.156*** 
(-4.254) 
      0.003 
(1.240) 
0.003 
(1.476) 
0.004** 
(2.340) 
0.005*** 
(2.639) 
0.003 
(1.272) 
0.003 
(1.488) 
0.004** 
(2.432) 
0.005*** 
(2.689) 
              0.356*** 
(8.691) 
0.440*** 
(10.169) 
0.069 
(1.538) 
0.227*** 
(4.892) 
0.360*** 
(8.765) 
0.441*** 
(10.181) 
0.071 
(1.585) 
0.235*** 
(5.068) 
              -0.499*** 
(-4.348) 
-0.451*** 
(-3.867) 
-0.325*** 
(-2.914) 
-0.374*** 
(-3.311) 
-0.447*** 
(-3.894) 
-0.442*** 
(-3.799) 
-0.302*** 
(-2.711) 
-0.383*** 
(-3.395) 
               0.198 
(1.428) 
0.312** 
(2.201) 
0.137 
(1.049) 
0.261* 
(1.942) 
0.232 
(1.670) 
0.321** 
(2.259) 
0.155 
(1.179) 
0.003** 
(1.967) 
               0.030*** 
(5.265) 
0.034*** 
(5.764) 
0.018*** 
(3.331) 
0.027*** 
(4.922) 
0.028*** 
(4.954) 
0.033*** 
(5.732) 
0.017*** 
(3.112) 
0.027*** 
(4.954) 
              -0.177*** 
(-7.473) 
-0.279*** 
(-11.65) 
-0.119*** 
(-5.225) 
-0.254*** 
(-11.088) 
-0.168*** 
(-7.127) 
-0.276*** 
(-11.623) 
-0.109*** 
(-4.806) 
-0.253*** 
(-11.114) 
            -0.042*** 
(-5.308) 
0.041*** 
(-5.211) 
-0.024*** 
(-3.656) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.737) 
-0.042*** 
(-5.382) 
-0.042*** 
(-5.261) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.725) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.813) 
             0.024*** 
(5.913) 
0.020*** 
(4.901) 
0.018*** 
(4.474) 
0.015*** 
(3.802) 
0.025*** 
(6.292) 
0.021*** 
(5.081) 
0.019*** 
(4.869) 
0.016*** 
(4.059) 
               0.013** 
(2.312) 
0.014** 
(2.560)   
0.014** 
(2.418) 
0.014** 
(2.535)   
              0.182*** 
(5.568) 
0.141*** 
(4.164) 
  0.182*** 
(5.566) 
0.136*** 
(4.017) 
             0.006*** 
(3.926) 
0.005*** 
(3.093) 
0.012*** 
(7.100) 
0.008*** 
(4.653) 
0.006*** 
(4.030) 
0.005*** 
(3.040) 
0.012*** 
(7.060) 
0.008*** 
(4.486) 
Dependent variable is       . Absolute t-values in parenthesis. Models are estimated with 2 factors, as suggested by PCA. Bandwidth chosen using Silverman’s rule of thumb. ***: 
significant at 1%, **: at 5%, *: at 10% . 
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TABLE 9 
Robustness Checks 
 Model with WCOOR  Model with UD  
 CUP - FM CUP - BC CUP - FM CUP - BC 
       -0.028 
(-0.216) 
-0.141 
(-0.991) 
-0.032 
(-0.243) 
-0.198 
(-1.352) 
       -0.174*** 
(-2.876) 
-0.140*** 
(-2.271) 
-0.139** 
(-2.324) 
-0.118* 
(-1.943) 
        -0.752*** 
(-6.261) 
-0.836*** 
(-6.766) 
-0.401*** 
(-3.445) 
-0.569*** 
(-4.730) 
     0.033*** 
(3.390) 
-0.001 
(-0.173) 
0.034*** 
(4.226) 
0.006 
(0.689) 
        -0.020*** 
(-4.325) 
-0.023*** 
(-4.573) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.538) 
-0.021*** 
(-4.522) 
       0.006 
(0.363) 
-0.002 
(-0.149) 
-0.020 
(-1.259) 
-0.021 
(-1.293) 
     0.015*** 
(2.634) 
0.012* 
(1.934) 
0.015** 
(2.711) 
0.010* 
(1.727) 
      0.001 
(0.634) 
0.001 
(0.506) 
0.003 
(1.303) 
0.002 
(0.730) 
        -0.021*** 
(-4.302) 
-0.017*** 
(-3.547)   
     
  
-0.232*** 
(-6.539) 
-0.173*** 
(-4.665) 
      0.003 
(1.451) 
0.004* 
(1.730) 
0.006*** 
(3.463) 
0.007*** 
(3.492) 
              0.349*** 
(8.624) 
0.424*** 
(9.907) 
0.036 
(0.803) 
0.208*** 
(4.452) 
              -0.738*** 
(-5.144) 
-0.256* 
(-1.741) 
-0.644*** 
(-4.589) 
-0.264* 
(-1.842) 
               0.396*** 
(2.914) 
0.367** 
(2.631) 
0.339** 
(-2.607) 
0.358** 
(2.670) 
               0.026*** 
(4.479) 
0.032--- 
(5.395) 
0.018*** 
(-3.260) 
0.027*** 
(4.888) 
              -0.182*** 
(-7.551) 
-0.278*** 
(-5.014) 
-0.135*** 
(-5.793) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.124) 
            -0.040*** 
(-5.032) 
-0.040*** 
(-11.414) 
-0.017** 
(-2.570) 
-0.270*** 
(-11.456) 
             0.028*** 
(6.814) 
0.022*** 
(5.354) 
0.022*** 
(5.482) 
0.018*** 
(4.471) 
               0.019*** 
(3.439) 
0.017*** 
(3.029)   
              0.188*** 
(5.742) 
0.145*** 
(4.269) 
             0.008*** 
(4.820) 
0.006*** 
(3.361) 
0.013*** 
(7.405) 
0.008*** 
(4.650) 
Note: Dependent variable is       .  Absolute t-values in parenthesis. Models are estimated with 1 
factor, as suggested by PCA. Bandwidth chosen using Silverman’s rule of thumb. ***: significant at 
1%, **: at 5%, *: at 10% . 
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FIGURE 1 
Real compensation per employee in EMU-12 countries, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations. 
 
FIGURE 2 
The Relationship between bargaining coordination and the real wage 
 
 
Source: authors’ adaptation from Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
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FIGURE 3 
The degree of openness of EMU-11 countries 
 
Source: Eurostat and authors’ calculations. The Degree of openness is calculated 
as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services over GDP. 
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